(Apology, 32c-d) This seems to be a recognition that one is morally obligated or at least permitted to disobey the state when what it commands is wrong--even if one fails to persuade it of its wrongness.
And similarly, Socrates makes clear that he would disobey the state and continue philosophizing if it were to order him to stop--again, on the grounds that it would be wrong for him to stop philosophizing (recall that he saw philosophy as his life's mission, given him by the god).
More precisely, the claim is again that a citizen who has a disagreement with the state must either persuade it that it is wrong, or else obey it.
In the voice of the personified laws: "either persuade us or do what we say" (52a).
Now which of these positions is it most plausible to attribute to Socrates in the Crito?
There are passages that might seem to suggest (e.g.
51e, 52a), but again, the obvious problem is that it seems inconsistent with his fundamental principle that one should never do wrong (49a)--at least on the assumption, which Socrates clearly accepts in the Apology, that the state is not infallible as regards judgments of right and wrong.
Thus, a more charitable reading would interpret the passages about the moral authority of the state as referring implicitly to cases where the state does not require one to do anything unjust, but merely to endure something (or perhaps to do something that is not itself unjust, such as rendering some political service).
Indeed, this serves as the driving principle behind the rest of his argument in the Crito.
But is this really consistent with maintaining that one must always obey the state, if one fails to persuade it that something it orders is wrong?