The possibility that upbringing-as-rescue might establish an equitable moral trust is contemplated, though such a trust demands so little from caregivers as to be an unlikely candidate for a plausible theory of upbringing. candidate in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. In his dissertation, he defends telic egalitarianism—the view that certain inequalities among people are non-instrumentally bad.
I conclude that the trust model of children’s rights should be handled with caution, and perhaps simply discarded in favor of alternative approaches. He is also interested in the application of egalitarian principles to questions about the distribution of educational resources.
For example, it is a commonplace that equal opportunity is an important ideal of justice in education.
But what exactly does this ideal require, how is it best promoted, in what does its importance consist, and how important is it compared with other ideals? In this paper I argue that, if John Rawls’s influential conception of justice, justice as fairness, is correct, then some of the reforms that these people have urged (e.g., ending legacy admissions policies at selective universities; altering flagship state universities’ admissions policies to promote fair equality of opportunity; and individual university professors nudging some well-off students into socially valuable occupations) are not required (and arguably not permitted) by justice.
He works on applied ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of law.
candidate at Arizona State University’s School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies.His dissertation in progress develops a contractualist account of parents’ and children’s rights. D., and is admitted to practice law in the state of Arizona.As an undergraduate he majored in philosophy and minored in psychology; he also holds an M. In addition to his academic work at ASU, Kenneth teaches philosophy as faculty adjunct in the Maricopa County Community College District and at Brigham Young University.S.: the third most populous country in the world with 327.7 million people; the largest economy; the most powerful military, among others. (There are numerous largely uninhabited islands that are U. territories as well.) The official status of each territory and its relationship with the U. South Korea has been the third-largest sending country consistently since the beginning of the 2000s, but its numbers have been declining steadily for years. has long been the top destination for Canadian students seeking degrees abroad. Historically, graduate students outnumbered undergraduate students. Now, however, undergraduates make up the largest segment of international students, thanks in large part to the rise of Chinese undergraduates. Compared with many countries in Europe, for instance, the U. has a weak federal government and lacks a tradition of vigorous government intervention. citizens—with the exception of American Samoa– and may freely travel to and within the U. However, they do not vote in general presidential elections (unless they move to one of the states or Washington, D. students go abroad for their education – either for a degree or short-term credit – though the number of such students has increased steadily over time. The country surpassed the one million mark during the previous academic year. faces increasing threats to its dominance of the international student market, not least from its own political and cultural climate, as the country is increasingly seen as unwelcoming to immigrants and foreigners. receives students from all over the world, but China and India particularly dominate the market, according to data from the Institute of International Education’s recent .Some of David’s work on these questions is in print in The Limits of Justice as Fairness: The Case of Higher Education Abstract: Many education policy scholars and philosophers of education believe that justice requires significant alterations in current U. This surprising result, I argue, is explained by two internally well-motivated features of justice as fairness, which I call : for social institutions that serve a politically essential function (i.e., institutions which are such that, were they not to exist, a society could not remain in the circumstances of justice), justice as fairness takes these institutions as fixed (even if these institutions tend to frustrate the society’s basic structure satisfying justice as fairness’s requirements), and requires that their effect be compensated for elsewhere in the basic structure.: for associations that are tokens of major social institutions, justice as fairness does not regulate their ‘internal life’ (roughly: their members’ interactions via their associational roles, and the admittance and exclusion of members), so long as the effects of these associations’ ‘internal life’ can be compensated for elsewhere in the basic structure.Given these considerations I defend a social-contextualist account of moral education that incorporates a participatory (rather than a paternalistic) pedagogical attitude.Further, instead of talking about moral education in terms of stages (as prominently argued by Piaget and Kohlberg), I argue that moral education ought to be characterized more in terms of a gradual understanding, appreciation of, and sensitivity to normative moral demands as they apply in various shared contexts and spheres of human concern.I make a case that children can readily meet minimal standards required for moral understanding and engagement especially in everyday moral contexts.Even when the child has no final say in her moral engagement with an adult, I maintain that there is still a significant normative difference between deferring paternalistically to the adult’s moral testimony and interacting with the child in moral conversation and dialogue.